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THE WAGNER GROUP'S THREATS TO REGIONAL HEGEMONS AND INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURES IN THE SAHEL REGION

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Abstract

This paper examines how the increasing influence of the Wagner group has impacted on the dynamics of regional security in the Sahel, particularly as it concerns the capacity of regional hegemons and regional security architectures to mitigate security threats in the region. The paper adopted the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) to explain how the activities of the Wagner Group in some of the Sahel states impacts on the entire regional security dynamics in the region. Relying on secondary data analysed using qualitative technique, the paper argued that the growing influence of the Wagner Group in the Sahel engenders distortions of balance of power within Sahel, undermines the intervening powers of regional hegemons like Nigeria, diminishes indigenous agency of regional security architectures within region and complicates regional security in the Sahel region.

Keywords: Regional Hegemons, Regional Security, Sahel, Threats, Wagner

Introduction

The name Sahel is derived from the Arabic word *sãhil,* meaning 'coast' or 'shore' (Bøås, 2019). The Sahel region of Africa consists of a large land mass situated to the southern part of the Sahara Desert. The region stretches from Senegal through parts of Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Sudan (Suleiman, 2017). The Sahel region, has gained notoriety as one of the world's most unstable security environments. It is plagued by a violent extremism, ethnic tensions, state fragility, and growing foreign military entanglements (International Crisis Group, 2023). The rise of jihadist insurgencies, such

as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), the recrudescence of military coups and the collapse of diplomatic relations between France and its former colonies have coalesced to worsen the security situation in the Sahel region.

The worsening security situation in the Sahel and the collapse of diplomatic relations between some Sahelian countries and France has further created an interstice exploited by some other international actors to proliferate and pursue self-serving interests in the Sahel. Among the most controversial of these actors is the Wagner Group – a Russian paramilitary organization with deep links to the Kremlin. The Wagner Group gained prominence during Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. But, since 2023, Wagner has undergone restructuring and was integrated into Russia's military structure, especially after the June 2023 uprising against the Kremlin and the suspicious death of Wagner's leader Yevgeny Prigozhin (Mehra & Demuynck, 2025). However, Wagner's increasing engagement in Sahel—particularly in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and the Central African Republic (CAR)—has triggered global concern. Wagner's entry into the Sahelian security theatre has brought with it a new dimension of geopolitics. Unlike traditional Western forces such as the French Operation Barkhane or the UN's MINUSMA, Wagner operates with little transparency or accountability, often exchanging military assistance for access to strategic minerals or political loyalty (Allison, 2022; Ramani, 2023).

In Mali, for example, the military junta that seized power in 2021 expelled French forces and welcomed Wagner mercenaries under the guise of national sovereignty and self-reliance. Since then, numerous human rights violations have been attributed to Wagner operatives, particularly during joint operations with Malian forces in areas like Moura, where hundreds of civilians were allegedly massacred in March 2022 (Human Rights Watch, 2022). This has exacerbated tensions between local populations and central authorities, driving further support for jihadist groups. Similarly, in the Central African Republic, Wagner's presence has emboldened the Touadéra government, but at the cost of mounting allegations of extrajudicial killings and resource exploitation, particularly in gold and diamond sectors (Carnegie Endowment, 2023).

Burkina Faso and Niger have also recently shifted away from Western alliances toward closer cooperation with Russia. Following coups in both countries in 2022 and 2023 respectively, transitional authorities began exploring security partnerships with the Kremlin, ostensibly as alternatives to what they

termed the 'ineffectiveness' of Western military support (Al Jazeera, 2023). In Niger, the July 2023 coup further complicated regional security coordination, especially given Nigeria's leadership role within Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). With the prospect of Wagner's deployment to Niamey, Abuja faces not just a weakened multilateral framework, but also the looming threat of direct Russian-backed influence on its northern border. The transnational character of the worsening security crisis in the Sahel means that no country remains isolated in the region. This is because, the countries within the Sahel share certain characteristics in common - border porosity, weak institutions, and ungoverned spaces all of which enable spillover effects from Wagner's controversial engagements. (Buzan & Wæver, 2003) rightly noted that security threats travel faster across boundaries of countries that are geographically contiguous.

Existing scholarship on the growing insecurity in the Sahel and the role of international actors have focused mainly on the ineffective deployment of counter insurgency strategies by international actors like France and its allies (Osland & Erstad, 2020; Charbonneau, 2021). Other writers like Okoli, Nwosu, Okpaleke and Ezenwa, (2022), locate the insecurity in the Sahel region from internal factors like the role of authoritarian leaders in Sahelian countries whose attempt to remain in power engender violence. Drawing from the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) perspective, this paper responds to the question of how the increasing influence of the Wagner group has impacted on the dynamics of regional security in the Sahel, particularly as it concerns the capacity of regional hegemons and regional security architectures to intervene in addressing security threats in the region. Thus, the paper locates the growing influence of extra-regional actors like Wagner within the context of the balance of power distortions it engenders in the balance of power within Sahel as a regional security complex (RSC), its contribution to diminishing the indigenous agency of regional security architectures within the Sahel, its role in complicating regional security in the Sahel region. As noted by Buzan (2003), the dynamics of regional security complex derives from the interplay between the anarchic structure and its balance-of-power consequences. We argue that the realignment of some Sahelian countries to Russia and the concomitant weakening of regional security architectures like the ECOWAS and Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) further undermines capacity of regional hegemons like Nigeria to coordinate regional responses to shared security threats arising from violent Jihadist insurgents.

State of Literature on External Intervention and Regional Security in the Sahel Region

The activities of external actors and the impacts on the dynamics of regional security in the Sahel region has attracted debate from scholars. Okoli, Nwosu, Francis & Olumba (2022) documented the role of external actors in the Sahel particularly in Chad where France supported Idris Itno Deby's three-decade rule because of Deby's campaign against terror in the Lake Chad Basin and wider Sahel region. Karlsrud, (2019) noted that the prioritization of war on terror by Western powers has ignited multiple military interventions across Africa especially in the Sahel. Financial and capacity-building support to the regional security by Western allies in Mali and Niger is seen as part of the global 'burden-sharing' of security challenges between the US and its allies. Karlsrud highlighted some of the specific externally supported security interventions to include the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) - a short-lived counterterrorism operation mandated by the African Union at the end of 2012. Following this was Operation Serval in early 2013 (converted into a regional operation called Barkhane on 1 August 2014). Operation Barkhane was simultaneously deployed with the FC-G5S. For Karlsrud, financial and capacity-building support to the FC-G5S and engagement by Western allies like Norway in Mali and Niger is seen as part of the global 'burden-sharing' of security challenges between the US and its allies. In another development, Bøås (2019), revealed that the crisis in Mali in 2012 led to various military interventions by external actors including France (first Operation Serval and later Barkhane), the African Union (AFISMA) and the United Nations (MINUSMA). These various international initiatives have also been supported by the deployment of a European Union (EU) police and rule of law mission (CIVCAP-Sahel) and an EU military training mission in Mali (EUTM). However, despite all these efforts, the situation on the ground has gone from bad to worse.

Examining the efficacy of external military interventions in the Sahel region, Charbonneau (2021) submits that counter-insurgency interventions in the Sahel have prioritized military interventions which failed to even bring stability to the region because counter-insurgency have been used as an incentive to repress opposition and dissenting voices thereby alienated the local population who usually turn to insurgent groups for protection and governance. Osland and Erstad (2020) agree that the military approach adopted by external actors in addressing violent extremism and irregular migration is the Sahel

has been counter-productive. The authors explain that the ineffectiveness of the military approach is connected to the fragility dilemma posed by the Sahelian countries which are in critical need of external assistance, but have limited absorption capacity to manager resources by external actors. Hence, in the Sahel, we find external actors desirous of supporting the fight against violent extremism due to their interest in ending irregular migration. However, they are faced with extending such supports to illiberal regimes which use such support to entrench regime protection. For Sandnes (2023), the relationship between the G5S-JF manifested in many ways, including military capacity building and resource distribution. The study pointed out that external actors hold significant influence over the joint force even though the G5S-JF and the G5 member states exert agency through managing and to some extent controlling their dependency on external actors. Barkhane trains and mentors the troops of G5S-JF deployed in the field whilst conducting joint operations. The EUTM is providing leadership and institutional support and supports the development of the military capabilities of the G5S Joint Force. The author notes: "The G5S-JF receives substantial support from MINUSMA, the EUTM and Barkhane, such as military capacity building, logistical support, financial assistance and resources, and in 2020 the joint force and Barkhane entered into a shared command." (p. 72). Much of the G5S JF's operations were either joint with, or with support from, Barkhane. All together, these studies seem to focus more on the formal intervention by Western external actors. Little attention has been paid to informal proxy intervention by external actors from the Eastern bloc, particularly Russia and how it is gradually increasing its influence in the Sahel through its surrogate – the Wagner Group. This study attempts to fill this gap in knowledge.

Theoretical Framework

This study is anchored on the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) as developed by Buzan (2003), Buzan and Waever (2003). The traditional definition of a security complex was a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be resolved separately from each other. This definition was updated to conceptualise a security complex a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both, are

so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another (Buzan, 2003 p. 141)

The RSCT posits the existence of regional sub-systems as objects of security analysis, and offers an analytical framework for dealing with them. It focused on the state as unit, and on the political and military sectors as the principal forum for security relations. The key assumptions of the theory relevant for our study include:

- all the states in the system are enmeshed in a global web of security interdependence. But because most political and military threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, insecurity is often associated with proximity (Buzan, 2003).
- The formation of RSCs derives from the interplay between the anarchic structure and its balance-of-power consequences on the one hand, and the pressures of local geographical proximity.
- RSC is characterised by a pattern of rivalry, balance-of-power, and alliance patterns among the main powers within the region as well as the effects of penetrating external powers.
- The security features of the RSC are durable in the sense that they possess a security dynamic that would exist even if other actors did not impinge on it
- RSCT focus on the securitization practices of actors.
- Meanwhile, superpowers transcend the local of geography and adjacency in their security relationships. Through the mechanism of penetration, superpowers can make security alignments with states within the RSC. (p. 46). This is because balance of power logics encourages the local rivals to seek outside help and through this, the local patterns of rivalry become linked with the global ones.

The key assumptions of the RSCT provides theoretical lens for explaining how the activities of Wagner in the Sahel region triggered geopolitical realignment in the region. The realignment of the Sahelian states towards Russia, facilitated through Wagner, disrupts regional security frameworks that Sahelian countries heavily rely on, such as ECOWAS and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The weakening of these platforms, compounded by the exit or alienation of member states like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, reduces capacity of regional hegemons like Nigeria to coordinate regional responses to

shared security threats arising from violent Jihadist insurgents. Furthermore, the normalization of military juntas in these countries—often with Wagner's backing—poses a normative risk to Nigeria's democratic stability. If unaddressed, this could foster authoritarian emulation or justify military adventurism within Nigeria's political system, eroding civilian supremacy over the military and democratic institutions. Wagner's actions in any of the Sahelian state inevitably reverberate across the region, particularly in West Africa, where borders are porous and conflict economies are transnational. Similarly, the proxy war dimension of neorealism becomes relevant as Russia's strategic assertiveness through Wagner challenges Western influence in Africa, turning the Sahel into a theater of great power competition

Historicizing the Wagner Group

The Wagner Group is a Russian private military company (PMC) founded around 2014, widely believed to be financed by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close associate of President Vladimir Putin. While officially denied by the Russian government, Wagner has operated as an unofficial extension of Russian foreign policy, providing deniable means for Moscow to project power globally (Sukhankin, 2020). The group presents itself as a security contractor, but in reality, it has evolved into a hybrid force that undertakes combat operations, regime protection, political advisory services, and strategic resource extraction in fragile and authoritarian-leaning states.

Wagner's African engagements began in earnest in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2017, where it was invited by President Faustin-Archange Touadéra to provide security assistance amidst a worsening civil war. Under the guise of protecting VIPs and training local forces, Wagner operatives quickly entrenched themselves around gold and diamond mines, taking control of key economic assets while simultaneously building influence within CAR's political and military leadership (Carnegie Endowment, 2023). Numerous reports have linked Wagner personnel to grave human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings and forced displacements of communities in mining zones (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

From CAR, Wagner expanded its operations to Sudan and Libya, where the strategic motivations were more overtly geopolitical. In Sudan, Wagner reportedly worked with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to secure gold routes and suppress opposition movements (Roth, 2023). In Libya, Wagner backed

General Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) during the civil conflict, establishing a significant military footprint that included drone operations and air support, while also gaining access to lucrative oil infrastructure in eastern Libya (Wezeman, 2022).

In the Sahel, Wagner's presence has grown in parallel with a rising tide of anti-Western sentiment and the withdrawal of Western military forces, particularly France. The collapse of Operation Barkhane in 2022, driven by deteriorating relations between France and the transitional authorities in Mali, left a critical security vacuum that Wagner quickly moved to fill. By late 2021, Malian authorities formalized agreements with Wagner, leading to the deployment of hundreds of Russian mercenaries under the pretext of counterterrorism operations. These forces have since participated in controversial joint operations with Malian troops, including the massacre in Moura in March 2022, where over 300 civilians were reportedly killed (Amnesty International, 2022).

Wagner's footprint has now extended into Burkina Faso and is looming over Niger following the July 2023 coup. Burkinabé leaders have welcomed Russian overtures, openly expressing dissatisfaction with France and aligning themselves rhetorically with Mali's approach. As of early 2024, evidence suggests that Russian advisors are embedded with Burkinabé military units, conducting operations in northern provinces affected by jihadist violence (International Crisis Group, 2023). In all these countries, Wagner employs a transactional model of engagement: military support in exchange for access to natural resources or political loyalty.

This expansion reflects not just opportunism but also Russia's strategic intent to build a sphere of influence across Africa. By inserting itself into fragile states plagued by conflict, Wagner provides the Kremlin with leverage over regional politics, access to vital raw materials, and the ability to undermine Western diplomatic and security frameworks. Consequently, Wagner's operations in Africa represent both a security and geopolitical challenge, particularly for regional powers like Nigeria, which are now encircled by states falling under Russian military and political influence.

Wagner's Strategic Interest in the Sahel

The Wagner Group's deepening involvement in the Sahel region—particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso—represents a strategic recalibration of Russian foreign policy in Africa, where military

diplomacy and resource exploitation are blended into a powerful foreign influence model. While presented as a provider of counterinsurgency expertise and security support, Wagner's presence in the region increasingly functions as a tool for geopolitical leverage and regime survival, often at the expense of civilian protection, transparency, and democratic governance.

Wagner's operations in Mali began around 2021 following the withdrawal of French troops under Operation Barkhane. Frustrated by deteriorating relations with France and the perceived failure of Western allies to contain the jihadist threat, the Malian transitional government—installed through a coup in 2020—sought alternative security partnerships. Wagner stepped into this vacuum, reportedly deploying around 1,000 mercenaries under a secretive deal reportedly worth $10 million per month, in exchange for mineral concessions, especially in gold-rich regions (Mariani, 2022; Al Jazeera, 2022).

In Mali, Wagner operatives have been involved in various roles which include direct combat operations alongside Malian troops, protection of key government installations, training of local security forces, and the securing of strategic mining sites in places such as Kayes and Sikasso. However, their presence has been accompanied by reports of grave human rights violations. One of the most notorious incidents occurred in Moura in March 2022, where over 300 civilians were allegedly massacred during a joint operation by Malian forces and Wagner fighters (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Survivors recount mass executions, sexual violence, and indiscriminate targeting of civilian populations under the guise of anti-terrorist operations—acts that not only breach international humanitarian law but also inflame local grievances and strengthen jihadist recruitment.

In Burkina Faso, Wagner's entry followed a similar trajectory. The military junta that seized power in 2022, led by Captain Ibrahim Traoré, increasingly distanced itself from Western partners, particularly France, while publicly courting Russian support. Though the Burkinabé government has been less open about Wagner's formal presence, credible reports suggest that Russian operatives have begun working with Burkinabé forces in northern provinces such as Soum and Oudalan—areas heavily afflicted by Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) attacks (International Crisis Group, 2023). Concurrently, the country has signed contracts granting Russian companies access to lucrative gold mining concessions, again tying security assistance to economic access in a pattern reminiscent of Wagner's operations in the Central African Republic and Sudan.

These engagements are not isolated tactical interventions—they embody Russia's strategic re-entry into Africa. Wagner functions as a key pillar of Moscow's broader foreign policy under President Vladimir Putin, offering low-cost, high-influence options to penetrate fragile states. Unlike conventional state actors, Wagner provides plausible deniability, operational flexibility, and an ability to circumvent international legal frameworks. As pointed out by Galeotti (2022), the Kremlin leverages Wagner to deepen military and intelligence ties with authoritarian regimes, often in return for political loyalty, access to extractive industries, and diplomatic support in forums such as the United Nations.

Moreover, Wagner's modus operandi undermines the institutional development of national armies. By establishing parallel chains of command, offering private loyalty to autocratic leaders, and operating outside constitutional oversight, Wagner entrenches a militarized status quo that weakens democratic institutions. For example, in Mali, the reliance on Wagner has coincided with increased repression of opposition figures, curtailed civil liberties, and postponed elections (Freedom House, 2023). These outcomes risk perpetuating the very instability that fuels insurgencies in the first place.

Additionally, Wagner's opaque nature makes it nearly impossible to hold its operatives accountable for misconduct. This lack of transparency has fostered a climate of impunity across their areas of operation. Human rights organizations, including the United Nations and Amnesty International, have struggled to access conflict zones where Wagner is deployed, further limiting scrutiny and legal redress for affected populations (Amnesty International, 2023).

Finally, Wagner's growing footprint also serves as a proxy for Russian geopolitical competition with the West. As France, the United States, and the European Union reduce their Sahel engagement, Moscow steps in not just with weapons and soldiers, but with propaganda, diplomatic outreach, and resource extraction. Russian disinformation campaigns, often spread via Wagner-affiliated networks, have framed the West as neo-colonial and Russia as a liberating force—an appeal that resonates in post-colonial states struggling with underdevelopment and internal insecurity (Stanford Internet Observatory, 2022).

In sum, Wagner's operations in Mali and Burkina Faso are far more than military missions. They are strategic instruments of Russian power projection that blend hard security interventions with soft influence tactics, often at the cost of human rights, political pluralism, and regional stability. As this trend

intensifies, the broader implications for neighboring states, particularly Nigeria, become more pronounced and warrant urgent policy attention.

Wagner Group and Exacerbation of Terrorism and Insurgency across the Sahel

Wagner's counterinsurgency operations in Mali and Burkina Faso, although tactically aggressive, have had the unintended consequence of displacing jihadist groups further southward, closer to Nigeria's already volatile northern borders. As military pressure mounts on groups like Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), they are pushed into peripheral areas where state presence is weak. Northern Nigeria, particularly states such as Borno, Yobe, Sokoto, and Zamfara, becomes a natural destination for fleeing fighters seeking refuge, resources, or new recruitment bases (Ewi, 2023).

The porous nature of Nigeria's borders with Niger and Chad exacerbates this dynamic. The Nigerian Immigration Service and customs authorities have long struggled to monitor and control transboundary movement in the northwest and northeast, allowing both combatants and ideologies to cross with relative ease (Okoli & Ogayi, 2021). Reports from local security agencies have indicated a rising frequency of unfamiliar dialects and tactics among armed groups in Nigeria's northwest, suggesting the possible infiltration of Sahel-based jihadists into Nigerian territory (Daily Trust, 2023).

Moreover, jihadist groups have shown high levels of strategic adaptation. As they are expelled from former strongholds, they often establish alliances with local bandits and criminal networks in Nigeria. For instance, the reported collaboration between ISWAP and armed gangs in the Lake Chad Basin reflects this adaptive insurgency model (Zenn, 2022). The arrival of displaced jihadist fighters fleeing Wagner-led operations may further entrench this trend, leading to the evolution of hybrid threats that combine ideological extremism with organized crime.

Wagner Group and Arms Proliferation across the Sahel

The Wagner Group's model of operations—often involving the exchange of security services for access to gold, diamonds, and other natural resources—has fostered the rise of unregulated arms markets across the Sahel. As Wagner supplies arms to client regimes and local militias, surplus weapons often

enter the informal market, fueling a regional crisis of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) proliferation. According to Onuoha (2022), many of these weapons are trafficked through long-standing trans-Saharan smuggling routes, eventually finding their way into Nigeria's northwest and northeast.

Nigeria's border with Niger is particularly vulnerable in this regard. The increasing instability in Niger following the 2023 coup has disrupted already fragile security cooperation mechanisms. With the potential arrival of Wagner forces into Niger—something that remains under consideration by the ruling junta—there is a significant risk of further weapon flows into northern Nigeria, especially via Maradi and Zinder regions (ISS, 2023).

The impact of SALWs proliferation is already visible in the heightened lethality of attacks in Nigeria's northwest. Armed bandits operating in Zamfara, Katsina, and Kaduna states now possess sophisticated weapons, including rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and high-caliber rifles, which were previously rare in the region. These weapons empower non-state actors to challenge state authority, overrun rural security outposts, and sustain prolonged engagements with military units (Okereke, 2022). Moreover, Nigeria's capacity to curb illicit arms trade remains limited. Agencies such as the National Centre for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (NCCSALW) are underfunded, poorly coordinated, and lack international intelligence-sharing mechanisms that would be critical in tracing arms back to Sahelian suppliers. Wagner's involvement in arms-for-resources deals thus presents a growing challenge to Nigeria's internal security and border governance.

Wagner's Activities and Distortion of Regional Balance of Power in the Sahel

Wagner's influence in the Sahel disrupts Nigeria's traditional leadership role within West Africa's multilateral security arrangements. As countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger realign toward Moscow and distance themselves from regional institutions like the ECOWAS and the African Union (AU), Nigeria finds itself increasingly isolated within the regional security architecture (Abatan, 2023). The viability of regional frameworks such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the G5 Sahel has come under serious strain, as political alignments fragment.

Nigeria has historically served as a regional hegemon and ipso facto, a stabilizing force in ECOWAS, as evidenced in its interventions in civil wars and political crises that engulfed countries like

Liberia, Sierra Leone, The Gambia to mention a few. However, the recent formation of the Alliance of Sahel States by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger following their suspension from ECOWAS signifies a strategic realignment that threatens Nigeria's hegemonic influence in West Africa, particularly across the Sahel (International Crisis Group, 2023). Wagner's role in solidifying this bloc provides Russia with a proxy alliance that counters Western and Nigerian influence in regional decision-making.

This geopolitical shift has real security implications. For instance, intelligence sharing and joint patrols between Nigeria and Mali have diminished since Mali's exit from the G5 Sahel and its collaboration with Wagner. With divergent military doctrines, conflicting alliances, and the lack of trust between Nigeria and Wagner-affiliated states, coordinated counterterrorism operations are becoming increasingly difficult (Adebayo & Eniayejuni, 2023). Consequently, jihadist groups are likely to exploit these coordination gaps to increase cross-border operations and consolidate control over ungoverned spaces.

Conclusion

The operations of Wagner Group's in the Sahel represent a proximate and pressing threat to the entire region particularly regional hegemons like Nigeria and regional institutions like ECOWAS and the AU. The convergence of terrorism, arms proliferation, regime instability, and great power rivalry demands a recalibrated regional security strategy anchored in regional solidarity, internal capacity-building, and global strategic engagement. Only through such a comprehensive approach can regional hegemons like Nigeria and institutions like the ECOWAS and AU, regain their intervening and coordinating positions in addressing insecurity and contributing to peace and stability in the Sahel.

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